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THOU SHALT NOT?
MARK STRASSER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Van Orden v. Perry1 and McCreary County v. ACL U,2 the
United States Supreme Court (Court) issued two decisions respecting
the constitutionality of Ten Commandments displays, upholding the
constitutionality of one but striking down the other as a violation of
First Amendment 3 guarantees. That the Court might reach a
compromise about such a contentious matter should not be surprising.
What is surprising, however, is that the Court could not decide the
appropriate test to apply in this kind of case, making a jurisprudence
that was confusing even more convoluted and increasing the likelihood
that there will be inconsistency in the lower courts regarding similar
cases implicating Establishment Clause guarantees.
Part II of this Article discusses the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, examining the Lemon Test, the Endorsement
Test, and the Coercion Test in the various incarnations articulated by
the Court over the years. Part III analyzes the Court's three main cases
involving Ten Commandments displays, noting some of the disturbing
turns that the Court's jurisprudence has recently taken. The Article
concludes that the Court's jurisprudence undermines the very
purposes of the Religion Clauses, because the Court's opinions in both
content and tone can only weaken respect for the diversity of religious
belief in this country and promote divisiveness along religious lines,
results which neither accord with the intentions of the Framers nor
good public policy.
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
2. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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II. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence 4 begins
with Everson v. Board of Education,5 in which the Court examined
whether New Jersey could reimburse the travel expenses of students
attending parochial schools. 6 The Court articulated a very demanding
principle for deciding Establishment questions, writing, "Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can ...pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."
7
However, there are at least two reasons to believe that Establishment
Clause doctrine is not nearly as demanding as might be inferred from
such a principle. First, notwithstanding that this principle seems to
prohibit the state from aiding religion in any way, the Court upheld the
challenged practice, 8 noting that to hold otherwise might imply that a
whole host of services could not be provided to religious institutions,
e.g., police, fire, and sanitation.9 By stating that the Constitution
precluded aid to religion but upholding the statute at issue, the Court
made clear that the Constitution does not prohibit the state from
benefiting religion at all but merely that there are (not clearly
specified) limits on state aid to religion.
Second, the principle articulated by the Court for determining
whether there has been an Establishment Clause violation has itself
evolved over time, and the current standards are not as demanding as
4. See Kevin Pybas, Two Concepts of Liberalism in Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 36 CUMB. L. REv. 205, 216 (2005-2006) ("[T]he issue that launched the
Court's modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence was one involving public aid to parents of
children enrolled in Catholic Schools .... in Everson v. Board of Education."); Nina S.
Schultz, Note, Davey's Deviant Discretion: An Incorporated Establishment Clause Should
Require the State to Maintain Funding Neutrality, 81 IND. L.J. 785, 788 (2006) (describing
Everson as the Court's "first modem Establishment Clause challenge").
5. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
6. Id. at 3.
The appellee, a township board of education, acting pursuant to this statute
authorized reimbursement to parents of money expended by them for the
bus transportation of their children on regular busses operated by the
public transportation system. Part of this money was for the payment of
transportation of some children in the community to Catholic parochial
schools.
Id.
7. Id. at 15.
8. Id. at 18 ("The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That
wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. New
Jersey has not breached it here.").
9. Id. at 17.
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the Everson standard. Indeed, some Justices have bemoaned the loss of
the principle announced in Everson, believing the current standard too
malleable. For example, Justice Stevens expressed his longing for the
days of Everson-"Rather than continuing with the sisyphean task of
trying to patch together the 'blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier'
described in Lemon v. Kurtzman, I would resurrect the 'high and
impregnable' wall between church and state constructed by the
Framers of the First Amendment. '"1
The Lemon Test is supposedly the current test for
Establishment Clause questions" and, indeed, was the test used in
McCreary County. 12 That test focuses on the purpose and effect of the
challenged state action. The Lemon Test initially involved three
prongs: (a) whether the predominant purpose behind the action was to
promote or undermine religion; (b) whether the primary effect of the
action was to promote or undermine religion; and (c) whether
excessive entanglement between Church and State would be required
in order to assure that the effects prong would not be violated, 3 but the
Court has since suggested that the second and third prongs can be
collapsed. 14
Two other tests for determining whether there has been an
Establishment Clause violation have been proposed: (a) the
10. Comm. for Pub. Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 18). See also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229, 257 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I am now convinced that Allen [Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968)] is largely responsible for reducing the "high and impregnable"
wall between church and state erected by the First Amendment, Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947), to "a blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier," Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971),
incapable of performing its vital functions of protecting both church and
state.
Id.
11. But see Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 685 (2005) ("Many of our recent cases
simply have not applied the Lemon test.").
12. The Court held that the display at issue violated Lemon's purpose prong. See
McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) ("Given the ample support for the
District Court's finding of a predominantly religious purpose behind the Counties' third
display, we affirm the Sixth Circuit in upholding the preliminary injunction.").
13. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582-83 (1987).
14. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000) ("[Olur cases discussing excessive
entanglement had applied many of the same considerations as had our cases discussing
primary effect, and we therefore recast Lemon s entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion
relevant to determining a statute's effect.") (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33
(1997)). Some lower courts still treat entanglement as a separate prong, however. See, e.g.,
Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Lemon's
final prong provides that a challenged governmental action must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion.") (citation omitted).
U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 6:439
Endorsement Test 15 and (b) the Coercion Test. The Endorsement Test
concerns whether the state action at issue would lead an informed
observer to believe that the state was endorsing religion and was
making non-adherents feel like second-class citizens. 16 The Coercion
Test concerns whether the action at issue would somehow coerce an
individual to profess a religious belief or engage in a religious practice
against her will. 17 The three tests in their various formulations are
discussed below. 1
8
A. The Lemon Test
Initially, the test discussed in Lemon v. Kurtzmanl9 was a three-
pronged test. The Aguillard Court provides a nice summation of the
Lemon test:
The Court has applied a three-pronged test to determine
whether legislation comports with the Establishment
Clause. First, the legislature must have adopted the law
with a secular purpose. Second, the statute's principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion. Third, the statute must not result in an
excessive entanglement of government with religion.
20
In order for a state action to pass constitutional muster, it must pass
each prong of the test.
2
'
15. Actually, it is not clear whether to treat the Endorsement Test as an elaboration of
Lemon or an alternative to it. See Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose through the
Objective Observer's Eyes: The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 417, 443 (2006) ("it remains unclear whether the endorsement test is a replacement for
the Lemon test or merely a new iteration of the effects prong").
16. See, e.g., Smith v. Lindstrom, 699 F. Supp. 549, 560 (W.D. Va. 1988)
("Endorsement by the state apparatus of a sect or a religious ideology strikes at the very heart
of the guarantees of the Establishment Clause because such endorsement provides a very real
threat of the symbolic disenfranchisement of a portion of the community.").
17. Helena Silverstein & Kathryn Lundwall Alessi, Religious Establishment in Hearings
to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 473, 511 (2004) (suggesting
that the coercion test "proscribes government policies that coerce anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise.").
18. See infra Part II.A-D.
19. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
20. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582-83 (1987) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-
613).
21. Id. at 583 ("State action violates the Establishment Clause if it fails to satisfy any of
these prongs.").
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1. The "Purpose" Prong
A state will violate Lemon's first prong if its intention was to
promote religion. The First Amendment's Establishment guarantee is
not respected when the state is attempting to promote religion
generally 22 or, instead, attempting to advance a particular religious
belief.23 However, where the state has more than one intention, the
analysis is more complicated. For example, the state may meet the first
Lemon prong if it has both a religious and a secular motivation. As
Justice Powell explains, "A religious purpose alone is not enough to
invalidate an act of a state legislature. The religious purpose must
,,24predominate. On the other hand, the Court has not suggested that
any secular purpose, however secondary, will act to immunize a
religious purpose. As Justice O'Connor explains, "The purpose prong
of the Lemon test requires that a government activity have a secular
purpose. That requirement is not satisfied, however, by the mere
existence of some secular purpose, however dominated by religious
purposes. 25
2. The "Effects'" Prong
The effects prong of the Lemon test is more difficult to assess
because the Court has adopted several different approaches when
doing the analysis under this prong. Sometimes, the Court has asked
whether the challenged action has a primary or principal effect of
benefiting religion.26 At other times the question is whether a
particular action directly benefits religion,27 which might mean that an
action which primarily but indirectly benefits religion would
28nonetheless pass constitutional muster. At still other times the Court
22. Id. at 585.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 599 (Powell, J., concurring).
25. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
26. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708 (1985) ("To pass
constitutional muster under Lemon a statute must not only have a secular purpose and not
foster excessive entanglement of government with religion, its primary effect must not
advance or inhibit religion.").
27. Comm. for Pub. Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973) ("It
is equally well established, however, that not every law that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or
'incidental' benefit upon religious institutions is, for that reason alone, constitutionally
invalid.").
28. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and
provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own
genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject
to challenge under the Establishment Clause.
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has asked whether a particular state action is more beneficial to or
more of an endorsement of religion than practices whose
constitutionality the Court has already upheld - a type of comparative
approach.
While the Court's primary-or-principal-effect test may
occasionally yield different dictates than the Court's direct-benefit-to-
religion test, the Court's comparative approach has had the most
radical effect on this prong, making it so open-ended that it seems
incapable of doing much work. Indeed, this prong is especially more
open-ended given the Court's tendency to recharacterize what it had
previously done. Thus, when deciding whether the state's according a
particular benefit to a religious group passed muster, the Court would
say that as a matter of neutrality the Constitution permitted religious
groups to receive benefits which similarly situated non-religious
groups were already permitted to receive. However, when looking
back at what had been held constitutionally permissible, the Court
would suggest that it had already held that the conferral of special
benefits to religious groups did not offend constitutional guarantees.
This would mean that in another case in which the state's conferral of
special benefits to a religious group was being challenged, the Court
could uphold the practice after pointing to past cases in which the
conferral of allegedly comparable benefits had already been upheld.
Lynch v. Donnelly29 is paradigmatic of what is described
above, both in how the Court recharacterized many of the previous
cases and in how open-ended the Effects prong was thereby made. In
Lynch, the Court considered whether including a creche in a Holiday
display3 ° conferred an impermissible benefit on religion in general or
Christianity in particular. 31 The Court compared the benefit at issue to
some of the benefits whose constitutionality it had previously upheld,
32 suggesting:
[T]o conclude that the primary effect of including the
creche is to advance religion in violation of the
Id.
29. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
30. Id. at 671 ("The Pawtucket display comprises many of the figures and decorations
traditionally associated with Christmas, including, among other things.., the creche at issue
here. All components of this display are owned by the City.").
3 1. Id. at 681 ("The District Court found that the primary effect of including the creche
is to confer a substantial and impermissible benefit on religion in general and on the Christian
faith in particular.").
32. Id. at 681-82.
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Establishment Clause would require that we view it as
more beneficial to and more an endorsement of
religion, for example, than expenditure of large sums of
public money for textbooks supplied throughout the
country to students attending church-sponsored schools,
Board of Education v. Allen, [392 U.S. 236 (1968);]
expenditure of public funds for transportation of
students to church-sponsored schools, Everson v. Board
of Education, [330 U.S. 1 (1947);] federal grants for
college buildings of church-sponsored institutions of
higher education combining secular and religious
education, [Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971);]
noncategorical grants to church-sponsored colleges and
universities, Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426
U.S. 736, 96 S.Ct. 2337, 49 L.Ed.2d 179 (1976); and
the tax exemptions for church properties sanctioned in
[Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397
U.S. 664 (1970)]. It would also require that we view it
as more of an endorsement of religion than the Sunday
Closing Laws upheld in McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); ... the
release time program for religious training in [Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)]; and the legislative
prayers upheld in Marsh.33
One might infer from the Lynch Court's comparative analysis
that in the previous decisions the Court had expressly upheld the listed
practices as constitutionally permissible conferrals of religious
benefits. However, that is false. In many of the examples offered, the
Court had not viewed the statute at issue as conferring a special benefit
on religion but instead had suggested that the State was simply
maintaining its neutrality by permitting religious groups to receive
benefits that others similarly situated were also receiving. Consider the
following brief analysis of many of the cases in which the Court had
allegedly upheld conferrals of benefits on religion.
In Board of Education v. Allen,34 in which the Court upheld
New York's providing secular textbooks to students in parochial
schools, the Court characterized the iaw as "mereiy mak[ingj avaiiabie
to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books
33. Id.
34. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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free of charge. 35 The Court understood that "free books [might] make
it more likely that some children choose to attend a sectarian school,
but that was true of the state-paid bus fares in Everson and does not
alone demonstrate an unconstitutional degree of support for a religious
institution. '" 36 Thus, the Allen Court likened the provision of textbooks
to the provision of bus services that it had upheld in Everson,37 and
implied that striking down either on constitutional grounds would be
unfair to religion.
The Everson Court admitted that the provision of bus services
to children attending parochial school conferred a benefit on religion,38
and understood that the provision of this benefit might make the
difference between a child attending a private versus a public school.39
However, the Court pointed out, the same argument might be made
about a state-supported policeman who was directing traffic near the
school.40 Basically, the Court treated the benefit at issue as one being
accorded to all,4' and implied that it would be unfair and, perhaps,
hostile to religion for the Court to strike down the provision of this
benefit to religion when everyone else has access to it.42
In Tilton v. Richardson,4 3 the Court upheld the provision of an
Act authorizing federal grants and loans to higher education
institutions for the construction of academic facilities. a The Act made
35. Id. at 243.
36. Id. at 244.
37. Id. at 241-42 ("Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), is the case
decided by this Court that is most nearly in point for today's problem.").
38. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17 ("It is undoubtedly true that children are helped to get to
church schools.").
39. Id. ("There is even a possibility that some of the children might not be sent to the
church schools if the parents were compelled to pay their children's bus fares out of their own
pockets when transportation to a public school would have been paid for by the State.").
40. Id.
Moreover, state-paid policemen, detailed to protect children going to and
from church schools from the very real hazards of traffic, would serve
much the same purpose and accomplish much the same result as state
provisions intended to guarantee free transportation of a kind which the
state deems to be best for the school children's welfare.
Id.
41. Cf id. at 16 ("[W]e must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against
state-established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from
extending its general State law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious
belief.").
42. Id. at 18 ("That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their
adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor
them.").
43. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
44. Id. at 675.
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clear that "no part of the project may be used for sectarian instruction,
religious worship, or the programs of a divinity school. 45 That said,
the Act was broad in scope: "Congress intended the Act to include all
colleges and universities regardless of any affiliation with or
sponsorship by a religious body" 46 - that is, the Act was conferring a
benefit on both religious and non-religious institutions. Permitting the
religious institutions to receive these benefits as well only involved
treating them neutrally.
The Court understood that helping religious institutions to
build facilities would aid them in their mission, but pointed out that
"bus transportation, textbooks, and tax exemptions all gave aid in the
sense that religious bodies would otherwise have been forced to find
other sources from which to finance these services. 47 But the relevant
point for the Court's analysis was not whether the religious institutions
would be forced to find other sources but rather that the state was
neutrally affording benefits to both religious and non-religious
institutions.
In Roemer v. Board of Public Works,48 the Court upheld the
provision of public funding to religious schools based on a finding
below that the funds would only be expended on the "secular side.
'A9
The Court again spoke in terms of neutrality - "Neutrality is what is
required. The State must confine itself to secular objectives, and
neither advance nor impede religious activity"5 ° - and again made
clear its understanding that the provision of this aid would free up
monies to be used for other purposes -"The Court has not been blind
to the fact that in aiding a religious institution to perform a secular
task, the State frees the institution's resources to be put to sectarian
ends., 51 The Court reasoned, however, that "[i]f this were
impermissible ... a church could not be protected by the police and
fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair."52 The
Court suggested that striking down the aid on constitutional grounds
would require interpreting the Constitution to mandate that "religious
45. Id.
46. Id. at 676.
47. Id. at 679.
48. 426 U.S. 736 (19716).
49. Id. at 759 (accepting District Court finding that the moneys at issue would only be
extended to the "secular side").
50. Id. at 747.
51. Id.
52. Id.
2006] 447
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activities must be discriminated against in this way,, 53 a view to which
the Court had never subscribed.54
In Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York,55 the Court
upheld a tax exemption for properties owned by religious institutions
which were used solely for religious purposes.56 The Court
characterized the exemption at issue as a prophylactic measure to
prevent discrimination against religion.57 The Court viewed its
decision as an exercise in neutrality, 58 noting that religion had not been
picked out for a special benefit but, rather, had been included "within a
broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations
which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional,
historical, and patriotic groups." 59 Thus, the Court reasoned that
religious institutions must be treated like other non-profits promoting
the public good, and that giving a tax exemption to the latter but not
the former would unfairly discriminate against religion.
In McGowan v. Maryland,6 ° the Court offered a neutrality
approach in upholding Sunday Closing Laws. While admitting that
such laws were originally passed to serve religious purposes, the
Court suggested that the relevant question was whether the current
legislation, "having undergone extensive changes from the earliest
forms, still retains its religious character., 62 Convinced that most of
the Sunday Closing Laws "as presently written and administered...
are of a secular rather.than of a religious character, and that presently
they bear no relationship to establishment of religion as those words
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
56. Id. at 666.
57. See id. at 673.
Governments have not always been tolerant of religious activity,
and hostility toward religion has taken many shapes and forms--economic,
political, and sometimes harshly oppressive. Grants of exemption
historically reflect the concern of authors of constitutions and statutes as to
the latent dangers inherent in the imposition of property taxes; exemption
constitutes a reasonable and balanced attempt to guard against those
dangers.
Id.
58. Id. at 669 ("The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an
absolutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions, which
is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited.").
59. Id. at 673.
60. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
61. Id. at 431 ("There is no dispute that the original laws which dealt with Sunday labor
were motivated by religious forces.").
62. Id. ("There is no dispute that the original laws which dealt with Sunday labor were
motivated by religious forces.").
448
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are used in the Constitution of the United States," 63 the Court
construed those laws as promoting the general welfare of society and
merely coinciding or harmonizin with the tenets of some religions.
64
In Zorach v. Clauson,6  the Court upheld a release-time
program in which students would be allowed to leave school and
receive religious training at another site. The Court suggested that to
refuse to permit this program "would be to find in the Constitution a
requirement that the government show a callous indifference to
religious groups." 66 The Court invoked the neutrality argument,
suggesting that holding otherwise "would be preferring those who
believe in no religion over those who do believe." 67
In almost all of the cases cited by the Court in Lynch, the
"benefits" at issue were characterized as generally available, such that
denying them to religious organizations would be treating the latter in
a less than neutral manner.69 Even when the benefits were not open to
all (as in Zorach, where students could only leave school to receive
religious training but not other kinds of training 70 ) the Court suggested
that striking down the program at issue would have given a preference
to those who did not believe in religion.
In Lynch, the Court implied that the benefits to or endorsement
of religion involved in having a holiday display including a creche
among other Christmas symbols 71 would have to exceed the benefits to
or endorsement of religion involved in the other cases cited.72 Yet, in
63. Id. at 444.
64. Id. at 442.
65. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
66. Id. at 314.
67. Id.
68. The remaining case, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), is discussed below.
See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
69. Cf Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) ("Government ... may not be
hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of nonreligion .... The First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion.").
70. See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 323-324 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
This released time program is founded upon a use of the State's
power of coercion, which, for me, determines its unconstitutionality.
Stripped to its essentials, the plan has two stages, first, that the State
compel each student to yield a large part of his time for public secular
education and, second, that some of it be 'released' to him on condition
that he devote it to sectarian religious purposes.
Id.
71. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) ("The Pawtucket display comprises
many of the figures and decorations traditionally associated with Christmas.").
72. Id. at 681-82.
2006] 449
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almost all of those cases, 73 the Court was insisting that religion was
not receiving a special benefit and that for it to hold otherwise would
be to disfavor religion.
Perhaps the Lynch Court believed that precluding the City of
Pawtucket from sponsoring a Christmas display would somehow be to
favor non-religion over religion, as if the City had erected many
displays and the only question was whether to allow the religious one
in addition to the non-religious ones.74 But at issue here was only one
display of elements commonly associated with Christmas. 75 Indeed,
the Court noted that "[e]ven the traditional, purely secular displays
extant at Christmas, with or without a creche ... inevitably recall the
religious nature of the Holiday., 76 Yet, it could hardly be said, then,
that this benefit or endorsement was one being accorded to all, and it is
difficult to understand how the cases in which the Court had claimed
to be acting neutrally could be used to justify the special treatment
upheld in Lynch.
Perhaps the Lynch Court was adopting a much different tack,
namely, suggesting that the benefits to religion which the Court in a
whole host of cases had done its best to minimize by suggesting that
they were merely benefits to which everyone was entitled, were
actually both special and very weighty. Yet, the Lynch Court offered
no reason for this radical recharacterization of the benefits. If no
reason is needed, e.g., because it is simply obvious that those
previously approved benefits were great aids to religion, then one
wonders why the Court did not realize this at the time it was making
the decisions or, perhaps, why the Court did not overrule those
previous decisions now that the Court had realized that what it had
previously thought were mere neutral extensions of benefits were
actually great aids to religion. Either the Lynch Court is suggesting that
73. For a discussion of the case that cannot be described this way- Marsh v. Chambers
- see infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
74. Cf County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (upholding a display just
outside a City-County Building of a Chanukah menorah next to a Christmas tree and a sign
saluting liberty). But see id. (striking down a display of a creche on the Grand Staircase of the
Allegheny County Courthouse).
75. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
The Pawtucket display comprises many of the figures and decorations
traditionally associated with Christmas, including, among other things, a
Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, a
Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures representing such characters as a
clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, a large
banner that reads "Seasons Greetings," and the creche at issue here.
76. Id. at 685.
450
THOU SHALT NOT?
striking state-sponsored religious displays somehow discriminates
against religion or that previously minimized benefits are in reality
special, weighty, and nonetheless constitutional, so that significant aid
to religion does not offend constitutional guarantees. Either way, the
Lynch analysis undermines the Court's credibility and appearance of
impartiality, because either position radically alters the then-existing
jurisprudence without any justification.
All but one of the cases cited by Lynch to justify conferral of a
special benefit to religion were, when decided, allegedly merely
upholding the "neutral" treatment of religion. One case cited by the
Lynch Court does not fit that mold. In Marsh v. Chambers,7" in which
the Court upheld legislative prayer, the Court did not focus on the
Lemon test but instead noted that the practice had had an unbroken
history since the Framers.
78
The unbroken history test is quite different from the other tests
that the Court has used when explicating the Effects prong of Lemon.
There might be an unbroken history of the state's engaging in a
particular practice, even though that practice directly benefits religion
and, further is more beneficial to and more of a general endorsement
of religion than is any practice whose constitutionality has been upheld
by the Court. Thus, there might be an unbroken history of a practice
even though that practice violates the Lemon Effects prong in light of
any of the characterizations of that prong offered by the Court. Indeed,
had the Marsh Court determined the practice's constitutionality in light
of its benefit to or endorsement of religion rather than its history,79 the
ruling on its constitutionality might have been much different. 80
The Marsh Court suggested that a practice in which the
Framers themselves had engaged would be unlikely to violate the very
constitutional provision that they themselves had written.81 Yet, as
Justice Brennan points out in his Marsh dissent,
77. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
78. Id. at 786 ("From colonial times through the founding of the Republic and ever
since, the practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment
and religious freedom.").
79. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court makes no pretense of subjecting
Nebraska's practice of legislative prayer to any of the formal 'tests' that have traditionally
structured our inquiry under the Establishment Clause.").
80. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("For my purposes, however, I must begin by
demonstrating what should be obvious: that, if the Court were to judge legislative prayer
through the unsentimental eye of our settled doctrine, it would have to strike it down as a clear
violation of the Establishment Clause.").
81. Id. at 788 ("Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clause did
not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment, for
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Legislators, influenced by the passions and exigencies
of the moment, the pressure of constituents and
colleagues, and the press of business, do not always
pass sober constitutional judgment on every piece of
legislation they enact, and this must be assumed to be
as true of the members of the First Congress as any
other.82
Then as now, legislators might have had the view that it was up
to the courts to decide whether something was constitutional,83
especially because there might have been conflicting views about the
constitutionality of a particular practice. 84 Thus, the mere fact that the
First Congress engaged in a practice does not establish its
constitutionality.
Even if one could be certain that Congress acted in light of
what the Framers intended the Constitution to permit, 85 that would not
establish whether the practice at issue is currently constitutional. 86
the practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued without interruption ever since that
early session of Congress.").
82. Id. at 814-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Cf Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 148 CONG. REc. S2096-02, S2106
(2002) (statement of Sen. Nickles: "We will let the courts decide whether or not it is
constitutional."); Sense of Congress Supporting Prayer at Public School Sporting Events, 145
CONG. REC. H 11325-01, H 11327 (1999) (statement of Rep. Edwards: "Let us also recognize
that the Constitution, in Article III, makes it clear that the Supreme Court, not the Congress,
has the power to determine what is or is not constitutional."); Conference Report on H.R.
2267, Departments Of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1998, 143 CONG. REc. H10918-07, H10933 (1997) (statement of Rep.
Hastert: "[I]f there is an issue of whether this is constitutional or not constitutional, we
probably ought to let the Supreme Court decide that issue.").
84. See Congressional Spending Limit and Election Reform Act of 1993, 139 CONG.
REc. S6412-01, S6412 (1993) (statement of Sen. McConnell noting that constitutional
theorists might disagree about the constitutionality of a particular proposed law).
85. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790.
Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations
of constitutional guarantees, but there is far more here than simply
historical patterns. In this context, historical evidence sheds light not only
on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but
also on how they thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by
the First Congress - their actions reveal their intent.
Id.
86. See id. at 816 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[T]he Constitution is not a static document whose meaning on every detail
is fixed for all time by the life experience of the Framers. We have
recognized in a wide variety of constitutional contexts that the practices
that were in place at the time any particular guarantee was enacted into the
Constitution do not necessarily fix forever the meaning of that guarantee.
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Consider the Establishment Clause criterion that some Framers
endorsed, namely, that the State was precluded from favoring one
Christian sect over another but could certainly favor Christianity over
other religions.87 Given that this is not the kind of principle that
anyone currently on the Court seems willing to embrace, 88 it is not at
all clear what should be made of the fact that a particular practice was
approved by the Framers.
If the Court accepts the constitutionality of a practice because it
was engaged in by the Framers even though some of the practices
which the Framers thought constitutional would never pass muster
now, then the permitted practice is more sensibly considered an
exception to a constitutional rule rather than itself creating a rule in
light of which other challenged practices might be judged.89 Yet, that
means that the Court should not compare a challenged practice to
legislative prayer to see which is more of an endorsement of religion
but instead should examine the challenged practice in light of the
current Establishment Clause test. While the Court has offered
different tests to determine whether the Lemon Effects prong has been
violated,90 it should be clear that Marsh should not play a role in
determining whether the Effects prong precludes the state from
engaging in a particular practice. 9 1
3. The "Entanglement" Prong
According to one understanding of the Entanglement prong of
Lemon, the Court scrutinizes the steps that a state would have to take
to avoid violation of the Effects prong, and seeks to preclude excessive
entanglements between the state and the institution it regulates.
92
Id.
87. See infra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.
88. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 880 (2005) ("history shows that the
religion of concern to the Framers was not that of the monotheistic faiths generally, but
Christianity in particular, a fact that no member of this Court takes as a premise for construing
the Religion Clauses").
89. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court is carving out an
exception to the Establishment Clause rather than reshaping Establishment Clause doctrine to
accommodate legislative prayer.").
90. See supra notes 26-76 and accompanying text.
91. This Doint assumes that the challenged practice itself cannot also be traced back to
the Framers.
92. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000) ("[O]ur cases discussing excessive
entanglement had applied many of the same considerations as had our cases discussing
primary effect, and we therefore recast Lemon's entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion
relevant to determining a statute's effect." (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33
(1997)).
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Because the Constitution precludes funding religious activities, the
Court considers how much oversight is required to assure that funds
received by religious institutions would only be used to fund secular
activities. 93 Where significant and continuing surveillance would be
required, the Court might well find that the entanglement between the
state and the religious institution would simply be too great.94 Where
little or no surveillance is required, the Court might well find that the
Entanglement prong has been met.
95
A different understanding of the Entanglement prong involves
how politically divisive a particular program might be, 6 e.g., because
the program would likely cause division along religious lines97 or
because it might give certain religious groups special political power.
98
Justice O'Connor explains that "excessive entanglement with religious
institutions... may interfere with the independence of the institutions,
give the institutions access to government or governmental powers not
fully shared by nonadherents of the religion, and foster the creation of
political constituencies defined along religious lines."
99
A straightforward application of the political divisiveness
element may prove to be less useful than was originally thought, if
only because the refusal to permit support of religion might also be
93. Cf Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971) ("The State must be certain,
given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion--indeed the State
here has undertaken to do so. To ensure that no trespass occurs, the State has therefore
carefully conditioned its aid with pervasive restrictions.").
94. See id.
A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will
inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the
First Amendment otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be
inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her
personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by
the First Amendment. These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive
and enduring entanglement between state and church.
Id.
95. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 , 687 (1971) (discussing the degree of
oversight that would be required to make sure that the facilities at issue would in fact be
devoted to secular education).
96. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 799 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Second,
excessive 'entanglement' might arise out of 'the divisive political potential' of a state statute
or program.").
97. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622 (discussing the "devisive political potential of these
state programs").
98. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982) ("[T]he concept of a
wall' of separation is a useful signpost. Here that 'wall' is substantially breached by vesting
discretionary governmental powers in religious bodies.").
99. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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thought divisive.' 00 In any event, this element has sometimes been
used in a nonstandard way0 1 - the lack of prior litigation concerning
the constitutionality of a particular display has been seen as an
indicator of its lack of divisiveness, which in turn has been viewed as
evidence that the display at issue has not been understood to be an
endorsement of religion.1
0 2
B. The Endorsement Test
Although the Lemon Test is currently the test by which to
determine Establishment Clause violations,'1 03 the Court has sometimes
used the Endorsement Test for this same purpose, without clearly
explaining the relationship between the Endorsement Test and the
Lemon Test._It is simply unclear whether the Endorsement Test is an
explanation of the Lemon Test, a modification of that test or, instead, a
substitute test. 10 4 Each of these characterizations of the Endorsement
Test has some proponents, and at this point the law is unsettled as to
how best to characterize the Endorsement Test.
0 5
Justice O'Connor herself has described the Endorsement Test
as the best way to understand both the Purpose and Effects prongs of
100. See Michael W. McConnell, State Action and the Supreme Court's Emerging
Consensus on the Line between Establishment and Private Religious Expression, 28 PEPP. L.
REv. 681, 717-18 (2001) (noting that "divisiveness is a two-way street."); Michael A. Paulsen,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 311, 347 (1986) (noting that "'divisiveness' is a
double-edged legal sword").
101. See Leading Cases, Government Display of Religious Symbols--Ten
Commandments, 119 HARV. L. REv. 248, 253 (2005) ("Justice Breyer inverted the traditional
divisiveness inquiry by rendering nondivisiveness conclusive of constitutionality.")
[hereinafter Government Display of Religious Symbols].
102. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
It is significant in this regard that the cr&he display apparently caused no
political divisiveness prior to the filing of this lawsuit, although Pawtucket
had incorporated the creche in its annual Christmas display for some
years. For these reasons, I conclude that Pawtucket's display of the crche
does not have the effect of communicating endorsement of Christianity.
Id. See also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 702-03 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
As far as I can tell, 40 years passed in which the presence of this
monument, legally speaking, went unchallenged (until the single legal
objection raised by petitioner) .... Those 40 years suggest that the public
visiting the capitol grounds has considered the religious aspect of the
tablets' message as part of what is a broader moral and histoncai message
reflective of a cultural heritage.
Id.
103. But see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 15.
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Lemon. Regarding the Purpose prong, she writes, "The proper inquiry
under the purpose prong of Lemon . . . is whether the government
intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of
religion."' 10 6 With respect to the Effects prong, O'Connor suggests the
following:
[T]he effect prong of the Lemon test is properly
interpreted not to require invalidation of a government
practice merely because it in fact causes, even as a
primary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion...
. What is crucial is that a government practice not have
the effect of communicating a message of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only
practices having that effect, whether intentionally or
unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or
public perception, to status in the political
community. 1
0 7
Thus, according to Justice O'Connor, the Endorsement Test offers a
way to understand both the Purpose and the Effect prongs of the
Lemon Test.
Some courts have read the Endorsement Test to do away with
the Purpose prong of Lemon. For example, in Freethought Society of
Greater Philadelphia v. Chester County,10 8 the Third Circuit
explained,
Under the "endorsement" approach, we do not
consider the County's purpose in determining whether a
religious display has violated the Establishment Clause;
instead, we focus on the effect of the display on the
reasonable observer, inquiring whether the reasonable
observer would perceive it as an endorsement of
religion. 1 09
106. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
108. 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003).
109. Id. at 261.
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In a different case, the Third Circuit suggested that the Endorsement
Test combines the Lemon Purpose and Effect prongs into one test
which only considers the effect on the informed observer. 10
Still other courts have understood the Endorsement Test simply
to be a modification of the Lemon Effects prong."l1 Finally, some read
the Endorsement Test as a different test altogether."
12
Regardless of whether the Endorsement Test is viewed as a
characterization of, modification of, or alternative to Lemon, the test
itself must be understood. Justice O'Connor explains the Endorsement
test in the following way: "Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community."' 113 However,
she does not believe that endorsement is established merely because a
particular state practice makes an individual feel as if she is an
outsider. Justice O'Connor notes that "adopting a subjective approach
would reduce the test to an absurdity. Nearly any government action
could be overturned as a violation of the Establishment Clause if a
'heckler's veto' sufficed to show that its message was one of
endorsement." ' 1 4 Here, Justice O'Connor is suggesting that there "is
always someone who, with a particular quantum of knowledge,
reasonably might perceive a particular action as an endorsement of
religion."'
15
110. See Modrovich v. Allegheny County, Pa., 385 F.3d 397, 401 (3d. Cir. 2004).
[Finally,] [t]he "endorsement" test modifies Lemon in cases involving
religious displays on government property. The endorsement test
dispenses with Lemon's "entanglement" prong and, combining an
objective version of Lemon's "purpose" prong with its "effect" prong, asks
whether a reasonable observer familiar with the history and context of the
display would perceive the display as a government endorsement of
religion.
Id. (citation omitted).
111. See, e.g., ACLU v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484, 492 (6th Cir. 2004) ("In order to
ascertain the primary effect of the action under the second prong of the Lemon test, we apply
the "endorsement" test, asking whether or not a reasonable observer would believe that a
particular action constitutes an endorsement of religion by the government."); Lambeth v. Bd.
of Comm'r of Davidson County, 407 F.3d 266, 269 (4th Cir. 2005) ("we have treated County
of Allegheny 's endorsement test as an enhancement of Lemon 's second prong.") (citation
omitted).
112. See Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 302 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) (treating
the Lemon Test, the Endorsement Test, and the Coercion Test as three separate tests).
113. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 34-35 (2004) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (citing Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
115. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Justice O'Connor seems to be suggesting that an individual
with a particular quantum of knowledge might reasonably understand
a particular action to be an endorsement, even though that same
individual would not so perceive it were she to have more information.
Justice O'Connor explains that "the reasonable observer must be
deemed aware of the history of the conduct in question, and must
understand its place in our Nation's cultural landscape."" 16
The Endorsement Test's including a knowledge requirement
seems reasonable - it is easy to imagine that individuals might feel
alienated by a whole host of practices if they misunderstand what
those practices are or what they are supposed to do. Yet, this
knowledge requirement can also be used to invalidate the felt
experiences of fully informed religious minorities,1 17 e.g., by saying
that no reasonable person could feel less a member of the community
when the State endorses the belief that there is one God." 8 Thus, while
it is fair to suggest that it would be an abuse of the Endorsement Test
to invalidate a practice on Establishment Clause grounds merely
because someone who misunderstood the practice felt alienated by it,
there is a great danger that including a criterion involving the
"Nation's cultural landscape" will erase the experiences of those in
non-majority cultures.
C. The Coercion Test
The Coercion Test is yet another test sometimes employed to
determine whether the Establishment Clause has been violated. As a
general matter, it is a more forgiving test than either the Lemon Test or
116. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117. Cf Pinette, 515 U.S. at 799-800 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
It is especially important to take account of the perspective of a reasonable
observer who may not share the particular religious belief it expresses....
If a reasonable person could perceive a government endorsement of
religion from a private display, then the State may not allow its property to
be used as a forum for that display.
Id. (citation omitted).
118. Cf County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 672-73 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[T]he Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag describes the United States as "one
Nation under God." To be sure, no one is obligated to recite this phrase,
but it borders on sophistry to suggest that the " 'reasonable' " atheist would
not feel less than a " 'full membe[r] of the political community' " every
time his fellow Americans recited, as part of their expression of patriotism
and love for country, a phrase he believed to be false.
Id. (citation omitted).
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the Endorsement Test, although there might be particular
circumstances in which it turns out to be more stringent than the
Endorsement Test, e.g., when state practices in the primary or
secondary school setting are challenged.
The disagreement about the proper application of the Coercion
Test centers on at least two different factors: (a) who is doing the
coercing, i.e., state versus private actor, and (b) what kind of coercion
must be involved to trigger Establishment Clause protections. Thus, all
agree that fines or imprisonment by the state would suffice to trigger
Establishment Clause protections but not all agree that peer pressure to
participate in a religious program occurring in the context of a public
school would also suffice. 
120
If the Coercion Test is only triggered by state-imposed fines or
imprisonment, the state is free to promote a variety of beliefs and
practices without violating Establishment Clause guarantees. For
example, Justice Thomas has suggested that the state's merely
displaying a religious symbol does not coerce anyone to do anything
and thus cannot offend Establishment Clause guarantees. 121
D. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: Conclusion
One difficulty posed by the Court's occasional use of each of
these Establishment Clause tests is that the Lemon Test, the
Endorsement Test, and the Coercion Test do not always yield the same
dictates with respect to what violates constitutional guarantees. For
example, a particular state action might violate the Lemon Test if its
primary effect was to promote religion. However, if that action would
not make an informed observer feel like a second-class citizen, then
119. See Kevin P. Hancock, Comment, Closing the Endorsement Test Escape-Hatch in
the Pledge of Allegiance Debate, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 739, 741-42 (2005) (suggesting that
requiring the Pledge of Allegiance to be recited in primary schools might pass muster under
the Endorsement Test but not the Coercion Test).
120. Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (noting that a school district's
control of a graduation ceremony places pressure on the students who attend and that "[t]his
pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion"), and
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHi. L. REv. 115, 158
(1992) ("I would have thought that gathering a captive audience [at a graduation ceremony] is
a classic example of coercion; participation is hardly voluntary if the cost of avoiding the
prayer is to miss one's graduation."),. wt Weisman, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scaiia, j., dissenting)
("The deeper flaw in the Court's opinion does not lie in its wrong answer to the question
whether there was state-induced 'peer-pressure' coercion; it lies, rather, in the Court's making
violation of the Establishment Clause hinge on such a precious question.").
121. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005). For further discussion of this
view, see infra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
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that state action might nonetheless be permissible under the
Endorsement Test. 22 An action that might make an observer feel like a
second-class citizen might nonetheless not coerce the individual into
professing or appearing to profess a belief she did not hold and thus
might pass muster under the Coercion Test. 1
23
Given that the different tests articulated by the Court to
determine Establishment Clause violations do not always yield similar
dictates, it would seem important for the Court to announce clear
guidelines with respect to the conditions under which the different
tests should be used. Regrettably, no clear guidelines have been
forthcoming from the Court.
That the Court has not made clear which test to apply in which
situation does not preclude the possibility that certain basic themes run
through the jurisprudence. Yet, there is no agreement about what those
basic themes are. Dean Sullivan argues that the Establishment Clause
"prohibits official partiality toward religion."'' 24 Judge McConnell
disagrees, merely suggesting that the "clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another,"1 25 a view which is quite compatible
with religion's being favored over non-religion.
The focus of this article is on whether a state may display the
Ten Commandments without violating constitutional guarantees. One
122. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Focusing on the evil of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion makes clear that the effect prong of the Lemon test is properly
interpreted not to require invalidation of a government practice merely
because it in fact causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or
inhibition of religion .... What is crucial is that a government practice not
have the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement
or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that effect, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or
public perception, to status in the political community.
Id.
123. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 609 ("Thus, when all is said and done, Justice Kennedy's
effort to abandon the 'endorsement' inquiry in favor of his 'proselytization' test seems nothing
more than an attempt to lower considerably the level of scrutiny in Establishment Clause
cases.").
124. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195, 206
(1992).
125. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1130 (1990) (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982)). See also
Patrick M. Garry, Religious Freedom Deserves More than Neutrality: The Constitutional
Argument.for Nonpreferential Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REv. 1, 3 (2005) ("As history
demonstrates, the Establishment Clause aims to keep the government from singling out certain
religious sects for preferential treatment, but it does not prevent the government from showing
favoritism to religion in general.").
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might expect that although discussing the different tests articulated by
the Court in the abstract may not be helpful, examining how the Court
has dealt with this particular issue will be more instructive.
Regrettably, even when the focus is specifically on the
constitutionality of state displays of the Ten Commandments,
members of the Court cannot agree about which test to use, much less
whether or under what conditions those displays pass constitutional
muster.
III. THE CASE LAW
The Court has issued three decisions on the merits during the
past thirty years regarding displays of the Ten Commandments, two of
which were handed down in 2005. Each of those decisions is discussed
below. The Court could have reached the same results that it in fact
reached, differentiating the factual scenarios in each case so that the
circumstances under which displays of the Ten Commandments pass
muster are clear. Regrettably, the recent decisions give the lower
courts contradictory signals regarding which test to apply and how to
apply it, making it even more likely that relevantly similar cases will
be decided inconsistently. The Court has wasted an excellent
opportunity to clarify Establishment Clause jurisprudence, almost
guaranteeing confusion in this area of law for years to come.
A. Stone v. Graham
Before 2005, the major Ten Commandments case decided by
the Supreme Court126 was Stone v. Graham,'27 in which a Kentucky
law requiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on the
walls of all pubic classrooms was at issue.' 28 That the copies were to
be purchased with private contributions did not immunize the postings
from constitutional challenge.' 29 The Court held that the statute was
unconstitutional,1 30 after noting the sacred role played by the Ten
Commandments within Judaism and Christianity 131 and finding that
!26. McCrepr Cnnntv v. ACLU. 545 U.S. 844, 867 (2005) ("Stone [is the Court's] ...
only case dealing with the constitutionality of displaying the Commandments.").
127. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
128. Id. at 39.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 41.
131. Id.
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the primary purpose for posting the Ten Commandments in schools
was religious. 1
32
In addition to mentioning the sacred role of the Ten
Commandments, the Stone Court analyzed the contents of the posted
Commandments themselves. The Court noted that the Commandments
did not only address secular concerns like honoring one's parents or
refraining from stealing or committing adultery or murder, 133 but also
addressed religious matters.1 34 By focusing on the contents, the Court
implicitly suggested that a partial posting of the Ten Commandments,
e.g., the latter five which concern more secular matters,' 35 might not
violate constitutional guarantees, whereas a display which includes or
perhaps emphasizes the first Commandments would be more likely to
offend the Constitution because they involve matters of a more
religious nature such as observing the Sabbath and avoiding idols. 136
The Stone Court made clear that the Ten Commandments could
be "integrated" into a public school curriculum where the document is
treated as a historical text in a broader context of secular study.'
37
However, the posting at issue did not serve that kind of educational
function.138 Instead, if having any effect at all, the posting would
"induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate
132. Id. at 41.
133. Id. at 41-42.
134. See id. at 42. (noting that the amendments concern "the religious duties of believers:
worshipping the Lord God alone, avoiding idolatry, not using the Lord's name in vain, and
observing the Sabbath Day.").
135. The frieze in the Supreme Court courtroom includes these secular amendments. See
Greg Abbott, Upholding the Unbroken Tradition: Constitutional Acknowledgment of the Ten
Commandments in the Public Square, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 51, 61-62 (2005) (noting
that the frieze on the south wall of the Supreme Court courtroom includes partial
representations of Commandments 6-10).
136. Cf Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden v. Perry, 14
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 5 (2005).
[T]he format of the Ten Commandments monument conveys its religious
message, not its secular role. For example, the size of the lettering on the
monument emphasizes the religious aspect of the Ten Commandments
over the secular. The prefatory words, "I AM the LORD thy GOD,"
appear larger on the monument than the commandments that have been
incorporated into secular law. The Commandments' prohibitions on
murder, adultery, and theft are smaller than the text which identifies God
as the source of the commandments. By visually emphasizing the religious
aspects of the Ten Commandments relative to the arguably secular
aspects, the monument belies the claim that it is commemorating any
secular role of the Ten Commandments in American law.
Id.
137. Stone, 449 U.S. at 42.
138. Id.
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and obey, the Commandments . . . [which] is not a permissible state
objective under the Establishment Clause." 139
After admitting in his dissent that the Ten Commandments are
sacred within some religious traditions, 140 Justice Rehnquist noted that
the Commandments "have had a significant impact on the
development of secular legal codes of the Western World." 141 Because
the Kentucky Legislature had required that each display of the
Commandments include a notation about their secular application,
142
Justice Rehnquist argued that Kentucky had not violated the
Constitution by placing a document with such secular importance
before its students. 143 An issue which continues to complicate and
confuse constitutional analyses of state displays of the Ten
Commandments is whether and under what conditions an articulated
secular purpose can make such a display pass constitutional muster. 
144
In 2005, the Court was handed a golden opportunity to clear up
Establishment Clause jurisprudence more generally or, at least, clarify
the conditions under which the state can display the Ten
Commandments in particular. In that year, the Court issued two Ten
Commandments decisions, McCreary County v. ACL U145 and Van
Orden v. Perry.146 While not creating a clear change in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, the decisions were striking in some of the ways
in which they were at odds, e.g., in whether the Lemon Test should be
used in this kind of case. Instead of clarifying an area which is
notoriously obscure and confusing, 147 the Court made matters worse,
making what seemed to be a hopelessly confusing area even
murkier. 1
48
139. Id.
140. Id. at 45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
141. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
142. See id at 41 (citing 1978 KY. ACTS ch. 436, § 1 (1978) (codified at KY.REV.STAT. §
158.178 (1980))).
143. Id. at 45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
144. See, e.g., Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1295 (1 1th Cir. 2003) ("Use of the
Ten Commandments for a secular purpose, however, does not change their inherently religious
nature, and a particular governmental use of them is permissible under the Establishment
Clause only if it withstands scrutiny under the prevailing legal test.").
145. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
146. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
i47. See W ilii F. "'"' . .... ... .....o,,w It," , ... TC , - L,. , T c , ... .. 70...1
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495, 495 (1986) ("From the outset it has been painfully
clear that logical consistency and establishment clause jurisprudence were to have little in
common.").
148. See Jay A.
Sekulowhttp://web2.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?DB=PROFILER%2D
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B. McCreary County v. ACLU
At issue in McCreary County was a posting of the Ten
Commandments on the walls of two counties' courthouses. 14 9 In both
counties, the following textual version of the Ten Commandments was
posted:
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven images.
Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in
vain.
Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.
Honor thy father and thy mother.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal.
Thou shalt not bear false witness.
Thou shalt not covet.
Exodus 20:3-17.150
The Ten Commandments were accompanied by other displays
such as "framed copies of the Magna Carta, the Declaration of
Independence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics of the Star Spangled
Banner, the Mayflower Compact, the National Motto, the Preamble to
the Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of Lady Justice."' 5 ' The
Court did not itself analyze the effect of including the Ten
Commandments with all of these other exhibits, e.g., by discussing
whether the inclusion of these additional documents made the display
as a whole secular, 152 but focused instead on the purpose behind the
WLD&DocName=0226647401 &FindType=h&AP=&mlac=FY&fn=_
top&rs=WLW6.05&mt=LawSchoolPractitioner&vr=2.0&sv=Split &
Francis J. Manion, The Supreme Court and the Ten Commandments: Compounding the
Establishment Clause Confusion, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 33, 50 (2005) (discussing the
"post-McCreary and VanOrden morass in which we now find ourselves").
149. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 850.
150. Id. at 851-52.
151. Id. at 856.
152. The Court noted without comment the lower court's having done so. See id. at 857-
58.
The Circuit majority stressed that under Stone, displaying the
Commandments bespeaks a religious object unless they are integrated
with other material so as to carry "a secular message," 354 F.3d 438, 449
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inclusion of the Ten Commandments, striking down the display as a
violation of the purpose prong of Lemon. 1
53
The McCreary Court explained that the touchstone of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is state neutrality among religions
and between religion and nonreligion, 154 noting that when the
"government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of
advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value
of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the
government's ostensible object is to take sides."'1 55  The Court
considered the history behind the display when attempting to discern
the state's purpose, noting that at first the Ten Commandments had
been displayed alone, unaccompanied by other documents. 156 It was
only after a suit had been filed challenging the displays that the
exhibits were modified. 157 Further, the Court made clear that it should
look at the evolution of the display when seeking to determine whether
the motivation behind the final display was constitutionally
permissible. 158 That is not to say that once a state has manifested a
religious motivation it will forever have that motivation imputed to
it. 159 Rather, the Court expressed confidence that a court would be able
to discern when there had been a genuine, constitutionally relevant
change in motivation. 160
Analysis of legislative purpose is often a difficult task. In many
cases, there will be no dispositive statements establishing the state's
(2003). The majority judges saw no integration here because of a "lack of
a demonstrated analytical or historical connection [between the
Commandments and] the other documents." Id. at 451. They noted in
particular that the Counties offered no support for their claim that the Ten
Commandments "provide[d] the moral backdrop" to the Declaration of
Independence or otherwise "profoundly influenced" it. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The majority found that the Counties' purpose
was religious, not educational.
Id.
153. See id. at 881 (affirming the Sixth Circuit after discussing "the ample support for the
District Court's finding of a predominantly religious purpose behind the Counties' third
display").
154. Id. at 860 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
155. Id. (citing Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987)).
156. See id. at 850.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 850-51.
159. Id. at 873-74 ("we do not decide that the Counties' past actions forever taint any
effort on their part to deal with the subject matter").
160. See id at 874. ("It is enough to say here that district courts are fully capable of
adjusting preliminary relief to take account of genuine changes in constitutionally significant
conditions.").
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purpose, 161 although a statute's wording itself may provide a basis for
ascertaining the intent, especially in light of comments made by those
promoting the measure. 162 Sometimes, it will be too difficult to
establish improper motivation even when such a motivation was
indeed behind the action at issue. The McCreary Court admits that
under the jurisprudence an Establishment Clause challenge may fail if
the existing religious purpose has been well-disguised 6 3 and the
"objective" observer cannot discern it,' 64 although the Court offers the
consolation that non-adherents will not feel like outsiders if the
religious purpose is extremely well-hidden. 165
In his dissent, Justice Scalia does not worry about instances in
which state action was secretly motivated by a desire to promote
religion but instead about instances in which the reasonably informed
observer would wrongly believe that a particular action was motivated
by religion. He writes:
Because in the Court's view the true danger to be
guarded against is that the objective observer would
feel like an "outside[r]" or "not [a] full membe[r] of the
political community," its inquiry focuses not on the
actual purpose of government action, but the "purpose
apparent from government action." Under this
approach, even if a government could show that its
actual purpose was not to advance religion, it would
presumably violate the Constitution as long as the
Court's objective observer would think otherwise. 166
161. See, e.g., State v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 898 P.2d 1013, 1024 (Colo.
1995) ("[Tlhe record contains no direct evidence of the State's purpose in accepting the
monument because, as found by the trial court, the State has no record of how the monument
came to be in Lincoln Park.").
162. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 862.
In Wallace, for example, we inferred purpose from a change of wording
from an earlier statute to a later one, each dealing with prayer in schools.
And in Edwards, we relied on a statute's text and the detailed public
comments of its sponsor, when we sought the purpose of a state law
requiring creationism to be taught alongside evolution.
Id. (citation omitted).
163. Id. at 863.
164. Id. (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (O'Connor,
J., concurring)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 900-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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Thus, Justice Scalia suggests, the constitutionality of a
government action with wholly secular effects might depend on
whether some "imaginary" observer misperceived that the action had
been intended to promote religion.' 
67
Justice Scalia's points are not persuasive. First, he fails to
explain why the informed observer would misunderstand the state's
purposes, notwithstanding the state's ability to establish its secular
purposes. Second, Justice Scalia fails to show how the allegedly new
standard changes anything, since it has always been true that the trier-
of-fact might misperceive the "true" purposes of the state. The
traditional Lemon test requires that the state meet each prong. If, for
example, a state action was found by a court to have been motivated
by a desire to promote religion, then it would not matter whether that
in fact was the state's purpose. Given the difficulty in discerning
motivation and the likelihood that individuals might wish to mask
illicit motivation, it would hardly be surprising to find that there would
be mistakes about a state actor's true motivation - sometimes, it
would be inferred that the state did not have a motivation to promote
or undermine religion when in fact the state did have such a motivation
and at other times it would be inferred that the state did have such a
motivation when in fact the state did not.
Incorporating the notion of an objective observer into Lemon's
purpose prong is not particularly surprising, at least in the sense that
the trier-of-fact would in any event be forced to try to figure out
whether the state's motivation was illicit.' 68  However, this
interpretation of the endorsement theory is much different from at least
how some courts had understood it. For example, the Third Circuit had
understood the Endorsement Test to discount motivation and instead
focus on effect-basically, the court suggested that even if a particular
state practice was motivated by a desire to promote religion, the
practice would not violate establishment Clause guarantees unless it
167. Id. at 901 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Some commentators overestimate the significance of this change. See, e.g.,
Government Display of Religious Symbols, supra note 101, at 258-59.
Although ostensibly reaffirming its commitment to the Lemon test, the
Court subtly but substantially reshaped the resilient doctnne by altenng its
most controversial and problematic element: the "purpose prong."
Departing from earlier versions of the Lemon test, the Court established a
rule that turns not on actual government purpose but on the "objective
observer's" perception of that purpose.
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would have the effect of causing the informed rational observer of
feeling like a second-class citizen.
169
The McCreary Court began its analysis by citing Stone,170
which suggested that a display of the Ten Commandments should
presumptively be viewed as intended to promote religion.1 7' The
McCreary Court noted that the display at issue before it (prior to the
First Amendment challenge) was relevantly similar to the display at
issue in Stone in two important ways: (1) each set out the text of the
Ten Commandments rather than a symbolic representation of that text;
and (2) each stood alone and was not part of a secular display.172 The
Court explained that Stone had emphasized the importance of
integrating the Commandments into a secular display. Otherwise, the
message would clearly be religious,' 73 e.g., declaring the existence of
one god or specifying religious obligations such as observing the
sabbath or not worshipping idols. 174 Indeed, even the secular
prohibitions, e.g., against stealing and murder, would derive their force
from having been prohibited by God. 175
The McCreary Court suggested that the way the amendments
themselves were depicted was important - a display of the text itself
suggests a religious message whereas a symbolic representation such
as ten roman numerals might be seen as representing a general notion
of law. 17 6 The Court was not denying the influence of the Ten
Commandments on secular law, 177 but was merely noting that the
original text is an unmistakably religious statement, 178 and that the
purpose behind the state's publicly displaying such a religious
statement without any other accompanying displays is unmistakable. 1
79
Two very different points might be made about the Court's
suggestion that roman numerals rather than actual text be used. When
symbols rather than particular text are used, there is no commitment to
one version of the Ten Commandments over another, whereas when
169. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
170. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 867("We take Stone as the initial legal
benchmark.").
171. Id.
172. Id. at 868.
173. Id. (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,42 (1980)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 869 ("This is not to deny that the Commandments have had influence on civil
or secular law.").
178. Id.
179. Id.
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particular text is used, a choice must be made among the differing
versions. 180 Thus, by using roman numerals, no choice would have to
be made between, for example, "Do Not Murder" and "Do Not
Kill.
,181
The second point was made by the Stone Court, namely, that
certain amendments are more readily viewed as secular than others.
Thus, a representation of amendments 6-10, as is represented in the
Supreme Court frieze containing the amendments, is farther removed
from the Commandments concerning obligations to the Deity than are
the first few amendments. 182 Indeed, the McCreary Court mentions the
Court's own courtroom frieze which includes Moses holding tablets
exhibiting the secularly phrased Commandments, 183 and, further,
which puts Moses with 17 other lawgivers, most of whom are secular
figures. 184 The Court suggested that there was no risk that this image
of Moses would suggest that the Government was somehow violating
its obligation to remain neutral. 185 By mentioning all of these points,
the Court offered several ways to differentiate the image in its frieze
from the depiction at issue in McCreary.' 
86
180. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 717-18 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There
are many distinctive versions of the Decalogue, ascribed to by different religions and even
different denominations within a particular faith; to a pious and learned observer, these
differences may be of enormous religious significance."); Paul Finkelman, The Ten
Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and Elsewhere, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1477, 1478-79
(2005) ("[A]ny display of the Commandments is inherently sectarian, because it must choose a
translation, ordering, and numbering system that will favor, or endorse one or more religions,
and therefore disfavor other religions.").
181. Id. at 1494-95.
Jewish Bibles, following well accepted Jewish theological traditions
and careful scholarly attention to the original Hebrew, translate this line as
"You shall not murder." Some modem Protestant Bibles, such as the New
Revised Standard Bible and The Living Bible, which is used in many
Protestant churches in the United States, also use the term "murder"
instead of "kill."
Id. (citation omitted).
182. See supra note 134.
183. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 874.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 652-53 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurrinR in dart and dissenting in part).
Placement of secular figures ... alongside these three religious leaders,
however, signals respect not for great proselytizers but for great lawgivers.
It would be absurd to exclude such a fitting message from a courtroom, as
it would to exclude religious paintings by Italian Renaissance masters
from a public museum.
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The McCreary Court reiterated that the key to Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is state neutrality among religions and between
religion and non-religion,' 87 although not all members of the Court
agree that this is the correct understanding of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. In his McCreary dissent, Justice Scalia writes, "Nothing
stands behind the Court's assertion that governmental affirmation of
the society's belief in God is unconstitutional except the Court's own
say-so, citing as support only the unsubstantiated say-so of earlier
Courts going back no farther than the mid-20th century.' 88 However,
Justice Scalia is not only suggesting that the state may prefer religion
over non-religion; he is also suggesting that the state can prefer some
religions over others. He writes:
If religion in the public forum had to be entirely
nondenominational, there could be no religion in the
public forum at all. One cannot say the word "God," or
"the Almighty," one cannot offer public supplication or
thanksgiving, without contradicting the beliefs of some
people that there are many gods, or that God or the gods
pay no attention to human affairs. With respect to
public acknowledgment of religious belief, it is entirely
clear from our Nation's historical practices that the
Establishment Clause permits this disregard of
polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as
it permits the disregard of devout atheists.' 
89
The McCreary Court responded to Justice Scalia's challenge in
two ways. First, the Court noted that there is a historical basis for its
position, since "there is ...evidence supporting the proposition that
the Framers intended the Establishment Clause to require
governmental neutrality in matters of religion, including neutrality in
statements acknowledging religion.'' 90 The Court did not claim that
the evidence supporting its position was conclusive, but merely that
the "fair inference is that there was no common understanding about
the limits of the establishment prohibition."''
187. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 874-89.
188. Id. at 889 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 892 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 878.
191. Id. at 879.
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Second, the Court noted that if historical practice is to be the
guide, then Justice Scalia is misleading when suggesting that the
Constitution permits the state to privilege monotheism,' 92 since
historical practice suggests that the state is permitted to privilege
Christianity over the other religions.1 93 The Court explains, "[H]istory
shows that the religion of concern to the Framers was not that of the
monotheistic faiths generally, but Christianity in particular, a fact that
no member of this Court takes as a premise for construing the Religion
Clauses."' 94 Indeed, the Court quotes Justice Story's suggestion that
"the purpose of the Clause was 'not to countenance, much less to
advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating
Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects," 1 9 5 not
to support it, but to suggest that Justice Scalia has not accurately
represented the views of the Framers and, further, that there is good
reason not to let the views of the Framers determine the meaning of
the Establishment Clause in contemporary society.
Needless to say, there is no agreement among the Justices with
respect to what the Framers intended. For example, Justice O'Connor
discusses the Founders' plan to protect religious liberty to the greatest
extent possible. 196 She, too, suggests that the Establishment Clause
requires state neutrality among religions and between religion and
non-religion, 197 although, as Justice Scalia points out, the Court has
192. See id. at 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The three most popular religions in the United States, Christianity,
Judaism, and Islam-which combined account for 97.7% of all believers-
are monotheistic. All of them, moreover (Islam included), believe that the
Ten Commandments were given by God to Moses, and are divine
prescriptions for a virtuous life. Publicly honoring the Ten
Commandments is thus indistinguishable, insofar as discriminating against
other religions is concerned, from publicly honoring God. Both practices
are recognized across such a broad and diverse range of the population-
from Christians to Muslims-that they cannot be reasonably understood as a
government endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint.
Id. (citation omitted). See alsoid. at 877 ("The dissent identifies God as the God of
monotheism, all of whose three principal strains (Jewish, Christian, and Muslim) acknowledge
the religious importance of the Ten Commandments.").
193. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 604 (1989) ("The history of this
Nation, it is perhaps sad to say, contains numerous examples of official acts that endorsed
Chistianity specificaily.:).
194. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 880.
195. Id. (citing R. CoRD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION 13 (1988)).
196. Id. at 881-83 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
197. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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certainly upheld practices which had the effect of benefiting
religion. 198
Justice O'Connor worries about the potential divisiveness
which might be caused by government's taking a particular side in
religious disputes. When the government associates one set of
religious beliefs with the state and identifies nonadherents as outsiders,
it encroaches upon the individual's decision about whether and how to
worship. In the marketplace of ideas, the government has vast
resources and special status. Government religious expression
therefore risks crowding out private observance and distorting the
natural interplay between competing beliefs. Allowing government to
be a potential mouthpiece for competing religious ideas risks the sort
of division that might easily spill over into suppression of rival beliefs.
Tying secular and religious authority together poses risks to both.1 99
Were McCreary the only post-Stone Supreme Court decision
dealing with the Ten Commandments, there still would be many
questions left unanswered. For example, the Court addresses the
constitutionality of posting the Ten Commandments alone, because the
decision to include other elements in the display was in response to the
legal challenge to the Ten Commandments being posted without any
other accompanying displays. The evolution of the display occurred
over a relatively short period, so it is unclear, for example, whether
McCreary would have any implications for a display that evolved over
a longer period or, perhaps, whose evolution was not in response to a
court challenge. Further, because McCreary's focus was on the Lemon
test's purpose prong, there is no helpful discussion on the effects of
displaying the Ten Commandments with other non-religious symbols
of the State. It would be helpful to know, for example, when
combining religious and non-religious displays dilutes the religious
message sufficiently to avoid Establishment Clause difficulties and
when such a combination aggravates such difficulties because Church
and State are viewed as intertwined.2 °°
198. Id. at 891 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Suffice it to say here that when the government relieves churches from the
obligation to pay property taxes, when it allows students to absent
themselves from public school to take religious classes, and when it
exempts religious organizations from generally applicable prohibitions of
religious discrimination, it surely means to bestow a benefit on religious
practice-but we have approved it.
Id.
199. Id. at 883 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
200. See, e.g., Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2001).
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Yet, the lessons of McCreary are utterly unfathomable in light
of Van Orden, leaving lower courts without direction or, perhaps, with
contradictory directions so that they can do whatever they have an
inclination to do. Thus, the claim here is not, for example, that it
would have been impossible for the Court to have offered an internally
consistent position in which it struck down the display at issue in
McCreary and upheld the display at issue in Van Orden. On the
contrary, the Court could have done so but did not, which suggests that
the Establishment Clause jurisprudence offered over the next several
years may well continue to be the antithesis of clarity and consistency.
C. Van Orden v. Perry
In Van Orden v. Perry,20 1 the Court addressed whether the Ten
Commandments could be displayed on the Texas State Capitol
grounds without violating Establishment Clause guarantees. 20 2 The
203 taCourt upheld the display, noting that the 22 acres surrounding the
Texas State Capitol contained 17 monuments and 21 historical
markers commemorating the "people, ideals, and events that compose
Texan identity., 20 4 The Court tried to account for the existing
jurisprudence by suggesting that the cases are "Januslike, ' ' 20 5 one face
looking toward the role played by religion in the Nation's history
0 6
and the other looking toward the principle that "governmental
intervention in religious matters can itself endanger religious
freedom. ' '20 7 The Van Orden plurality explained,
One face looks to the past in acknowledgment of our
Nation's heritage, while the other looks to the present in
demanding a separation between church and state.
Moreover, an observer who views the entire monument may reasonably
believe that it impermissibly links religion and law since the Bill of Rights
and the 1851 Preamble are near the sacred text. This would signal that the
state approved of such a link, and was sending a message of endorsement.
Id. See also ACLU v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484, 494 (6th Cir. 2004) ("By placing the
Decalogue in apparent equipoise with the Bill of Rights in this manner, DeWeese has created
the effect of an endorsement of a particular religious code, vis a vis the Ten Commandments,
by the government.").
201. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
202. Id. at 681-82.
203. See id.
204. See id. (citing TEX. H. CoN. REs. 38, 77th Leg. (2001)).
205. Id. at 683.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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Reconciling these two faces requires that we neither
abdicate our responsibility to maintain a division
between church and state nor evince a hostility to
religion by disabling the government from in some
ways recognizing our religious heritage.
208
While one might quibble with this characterization unless, for
example, religious freedom is meant to include the freedom to believe
in many gods or in no god,2 °9 it nonetheless might be consistent with
any of the traditional tests used to determine whether the
Establishment Clause has been violated. Yet, the Van Orden plurality
is not simply finessing the difficulty posed by the Court's having
articulated several Establishment Clause tests without ever having
specified which was appropriate in which circumstances. On the
contrary, the plurality wrote, "Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon
test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we
think it not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that
Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds."
210
The difficulty posed by the plurality's statement is not in
limiting the conditions under which Lemon will be used, e.g., saying
that it is the test in cases involving state aid but not in cases in which
the posting of a display with a religious message is at issue. Rather, the
difficulty is that Van Orden suggests that in a case involving a passive
display of the Ten Commandments Lemon should not be used while
McCreary suggests that in a case involving the passive display of the
Ten Commandments Lemon should be used.
It is at best regrettable that the Van Orden plurality describes
Marsh v. Chambers - in which the Court held that a state can open its
daily session with a prayer by a state-paid chaplain21 1 - as merely
implicating the recognition of the role that belief in God has played in
this Nation's heritage.2 12 If the paradigmatically religious exercise -
prayer213 - is merely a recognition that the belief in God has played
208. Id.
209. But see McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 892-94 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("With respect to public acknowledgment of religious belief, it is entirely clear
from our Nation's historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of
polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout
atheists.").
210. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 685.
211. Id. at 688-89.
212. Id. at 686.
213. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 797-98 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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an important role in the Nation's development or even that many
214people believe in God, then it is difficult to imagine what the
Establishment Clause forbids.
While recognizing that the Ten Commandments are religious
215
the Van Orden plurality noted that they also have an historical
meaning. 1 6 Because the Ten Commandments have both meanings,
there are contexts in which they might be permissibly displayed. For
example, as the Stone Court noted, the Ten Commandments can be
integrated into a school curriculum 217 Yet, given that there are contexts
in which the Ten Commandments may not be displayed 218 and other
contexts in which they may be displayed, one might have expected the
Van Orden plurality to have offered a careful analysis explaining why
this display was permissible. Regrettably, no such analysis was
offered.
The Van Orden Court did differentiate what was before it from
what had been at issue in Stone, suggesting that the placement at issue
before it was "far more passive" than was the Stone display.219 Yet, it
is not as if the Ten Commandments "did" anything in Stone other than
remain passively on the wall. 220  Nor is it clear that the Ten
That the "purpose" of legislative prayer is preeminently religious
rather than secular seems to me to be self-evident. "To invoke Divine
guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws," is nothing but
a religious act. Moreover, whatever secular functions legislative prayer
might play - formally opening the legislative session, getting the members
of the body to quiet down, and imbuing them with a sense of seriousness
and high purpose - could so plainly be performed in a purely nonreligious
fashion that to claim a secular purpose for the prayer is an insult to the
perfectly honorable individuals who instituted and continue the practice.
Id.
214. See id. at 792 ("To invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making
the laws is not, in these circumstances, an 'establishment' of religion or a step toward
establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the
people of this country.").
215. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 689.
216. Id.
217. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,42 (1980).
218. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690.
There are, of course, limits to the display of religious messages or
symbols. For example, we held unconstitutional a Kentucky statute
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in every public
schoolroom .... In the classroom context, we found that the Kentucky
statute had an improper and plainiy reiigious purpose.
Id. (citation omitted).
219. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691.
220. See id. at 745 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Nor can the plurality deflect Stone by calling the Texas monument "a
far more passive use of [the Decalogue] than was the case in Stone, where
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Commandments in Van Orden were any more passive than the Ten
Commandments in McCreary.
The Van Orden plurality might not have been trying to
distinguish what was at issue in McCreary from what was at issue in
Van Orden, because the Van Orden plurality221 disagreed with the
holding in McCreary.222 Of course, it is also true that then-Justice
Rehnquist dissented in Stone, so he might not have been expected to
try to distinguish Stone either.
The discussion of passive displays in Van Orden raised more
questions than it answered. However, it may well not have been
designed to explicate the notion of what counts as passive for
Establishment Clause purposes but instead merely to secure Justice
Kennedy's vote.
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU,223 Justice Kennedy suggested
in his dissent that "where the government's act of recognition or
accommodation is passive and symbolic ... any intangible benefit to
religion is unlikely to present a realistic risk of establishment. Absent
coercion, the risk of infringement of religious liberty by passive or
symbolic accommodation is minimal. 224 Of course, even Justice
Kennedy believes that some passive displays might violate
constitutional guarantees, for example, the permanent placement of a
large Latin cross on a city hall roof,22 5 although he does not make clear
why such a display would be unconstitutional. While he suggests that
such a display would place the government behind an obvious attempt
to proselytize for a particular religion, one does not know which
features would make such a display unconstitutional. Would it matter,
for example, if a large Latin cross and a Star of David were
permanently erected on the roof of city hall, since it would then not be
the case that the state was trying to proselytize on behalf of a particular
religion? Would it matter if year after year the City erected a large
the text confronted elementary school students every day." Placing a
monument on the ground is not more "passive" than hanging a sheet of
paper on a wall when both contain the same text to be read by anyone who
looks at it.
Id. (citation omitted).
221. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas comprised the
plurality. See id at 680.
222. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 885 (2005) (Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas signed onto Justice Scalia's dissent and Justice Kennedy signed onto Parts
II and III of the dissent.).
223. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
224. Id. at 662 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 661 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Latin cross on the city hall roof for six months of the year? Would it
matter if the cross were in a park rather than on top of city hall?
Justice Kennedy referred in his Allegheny opinion to three
decisions: 226 Friedman v. Board of County Commissioners of
Bernalillo County,227 in which the Tenth Circuit struck down a county
government's use of a seal bearing a cross and the words, "With This
We Overcome,' ' 228 on Establishment Clause grounds;229 American
Civil Liberties Union of Georgia v. Rabun County Chamber of
Commerce, Inc.,230 in which the Eleventh Circuit held that maintaining
a cross in a state park violates the Establishment Clause; 231 and Lowe
v. Eugene,232 in which the Oregon Supreme Court struck down the
issuance of building permits for the erection of a cross on city-owned
park property as a violation of the Establishment Clause.233 Justice
Kennedy did not mention whether he agreed with these decisions,
although his citing them might be taken to suggest that he would find a
cross standing alone in a state- or city-owned park to be a violation of
constitutional guarantees.
While Justices Scalia and Thomas signed onto Justice
Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Van Orden, their concurrences made
clear that they were not exactly endorsing Rehnquist's analysis.
Justice Scalia writes, "I join the opinion of The Chief Justice because I
think it accurately reflects our current Establishment Clause
jurisprudence-or at least the Establishment Clause jurisprudence we
currently apply some of the time." 234 Of course, given the variation in
235the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it is not a ringing
endorsement to say that a decision captures how the Establishment
Clause is sometimes applied. In any event, on Justice Scalia's view,
the Establishment Clause is rather forgiving. He suggests that "there is
nothing unconstitutional in a State's favoring religion generally,
honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a
226. Id.
227. 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
228. Id. at 779.
229. Id. at 782.
230. 698 F.2d 1098 (11 th Cir. 1983).
231. Id. at 1111.
232. 463 P.2d 360 (Or. 1969).
233. See id. at 363 ("Public land cannot be set apart tor the permanent dispiay of mi
essentially religious symbol when the display connotes government sponsorship.").
234. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
235. See id. at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("the incoherence of the Court's decisions in
this area renders the Establishment Clause impenetrable and incapable of consistent
application").
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nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments. '" 236
While he does not specify what would count as venerating the Ten
Commandments in a non-proselytizing manner, one infers that Ten
Commandments which do not represent the views of one sect in
particular but, instead, represent an amalgam of beliefs would not
237count as proselytizing. Ironically, this is exactly the kind of position
rejected in Lynch in which the Court denied that there could be a kind
of civil religious language which could somehow bypass
Establishment Clause guarantees.238
When considering whether there can be civil religious language
which could bypass Establishment Clause guarantees, it is helpful to
distinguish between a non-sectarian version of the Ten
Commandments, e.g., one which incorporates Jewish, Catholic and
Protestant views, 239  and a secularized version of the Ten
Commandments. While the Ten Commandments in Van Orden might
be viewed as nonsectarian,240 they certainly should not be viewed as
secular, since they did concern the nature of God and human relations
to God.24 1 The Establishment Clause requires more than mere
236. Id. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring).
237. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 n.4 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("This is not to say that a display of the Ten Commandments could never
constitute an impermissible endorsement of a particular religious view. The Establishment
Clause would prohibit, for example, governmental endorsement of a particular version of the
Decalogue as authoritative.").
238. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992).
We are asked to recognize the existence of a practice of nonsectarian
prayer, prayer within the embrace of what is known as the Judeo-Christian
tradition, prayer which is more acceptable than one which, for example,
makes explicit references to the God of Israel, or to Jesus Christ, or to a
patron saint ..... The First Amendment's Religion Clauses mean that
religious beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be either
proscribed or prescribed by the State. The design of the Constitution is
that preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a
responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere, which itself is
promised freedom to pursue that mission.
Id.
239. See Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 2001) ("the
Fraternal Order of the Eagles donated plaques inscribed with a version of the Ten
Commandments (developed by representatives of Judaism, Protestantism, and Catholicism) to
communities across the United States during the 1950s.").
240. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701 (noting the "Eagles' consultation with a committee
composed of members of several faiths in order to find a nonsectarian text").
241. See id. at 707 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The monument is not a work of art and does not refer to any event in the
history of the State. It is significant because, and only because, it
communicates the following message:
I AM the LORD thy God.
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
THOU SHALT NOT?
neutrality among several religious faiths - nonsectarian should not be
thought the equivalent of secular.
Justice Thomas joined the opinion because Chief Justice
Rehnquist "recognizes that the monument has 'religious significance'.
. . [and] the role of religion in this Nation's history and the
permissibility of government displays acknowledging that history.,
242
However, Justice Thomas's view of the Establishment Clause is even
more forgiving than that of Justice Scalia's in that Justice Thomas
does not believe that the Establishment Clause restrains state (as
opposed to federal) action.243 Further, Justice Thomas believes that the
only coercion prohibited by the Establishment Clause is actual legal
coercion.244 Justice Thomas notes,
In no sense does Texas compel petitioner Van Orden to
do anything. The only injury to him is that he takes
offense at seeing the monument as he passes it on his
way to the Texas Supreme Court Library. He need not
stop to read it or even to look at it, let alone to express
support for it or adopt the Commandments as guides for
his life. The mere presence of the monument along his
path involves no coercion and thus does not violate the
Establishment Clause.245
Thus, on Justice Thomas's view, even Justice Kennedy's example of
the Latin Cross permanently erected on City Hall would not violate
Establishment Clause guarantees.
Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images.
Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain.
Id.
242. Id. at 692 (Thomas, J., concurring).
243. See id at 692-93 (Thomas, J., concurring).
244. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
245. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). See also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
644 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
There is no suggestion here that the government's power to coerce
has been used to further the interests of Christianity or Judaism in any
way. No one was compelled to observe or participate in any religious
ceremony or activity. Neither the city nor the county contributed
Rianificant amounts of tax money to serve the cause of one religious faith.
The creche and the menorah are purely passive symbols o1 religious
holidays. Passersby who disagree with the message conveyed by these
displays are free to ignore them, or even to turn their backs, just as they
are free to do when they disagree with any other form of government
speech.
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Justice Breyer's Van Orden concurrence in the judgment is
perhaps the most difficult to read insofar as one wishes prospective
guidance. He mentions the basic purposes of the Religion Clauses,
which he suggests include: assuring the greatest possible religious
liberty and tolerance for all,246 avoiding divisiveness that is based upon
religion,247 and maintaining separation of church and state.248 While
noting that the government must avoid excessively interfering with or
promoting religion, 249 he also suggests that "the Establishment Clause
does not compel the government to purge from the public sphere all
that in any way partakes of the religious. ' '250 Yet, no one suggests that
everything remotely religious must be kept out of the public sphere,
and it is unclear why a discussion of matters that in any way partake of
the religious is relevant in a discussion of something paradigmatically
religious like the Ten Commandments, especially because the real
question before the Court is when rather than if something
paradigmatically religious such as the Ten Commandments can be in
the public sphere.251
Justice Breyer suggests that in borderline cases there is no
substitute for the exercise of "legal judgment. ' '252 The case before the
Court was borderline because the text of the Ten Commandments is
undeniably religious on the one hand,253 but on the other such a
display can convey an historical or a "secular moral message" 254 in
addition to a religious one. Justice Breyer noted that in the instant case
the tablets were part of a display communicating both a religious and a
255 Atht'
secular message, and that the group that had donated the monument
had sought to highlight the role of the Ten Commandments in shaping
public morality in an effort to combat juvenile delinquency.256 As
246. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
247. Id. (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717-29 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
248. Id. (citing A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282-83 (1835) (H.
Mansfield & D. Winthrop transls. and eds. 2000).
249. Id. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring).
250. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
251. See, e.g., id. at 2894 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("And the Decalogue could, as Stone
suggested, be integrated constitutionally into a course of study in public schools.").
252. Id. at 742 (Breyer, J., concurring).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 679 (Breyer, J., concurring).
255. Id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring).
256. Id.
480
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evidence of their nonreligious motivation, he noted the group had
consulted with members of several faiths to find a nonsectarian text. 257
Justice Breyer seems to conflate a nonsectarian motivation with
a nonreligious one. It may be, for example, that the group wanted to
reach (or at least not offend) a broad base of religious groups, but that
hardly speaks to whether the group's motivation was religious rather
than non-religious. Further, even were the Ten Commandments
viewed as broadly nonsectarian (rather than as favoring some religions
over others), the state's displaying the Commandments might well
violate an obligation to remain neutral between religion and non-
religion.
As further evidence of the secular nature of the message,
Justice Breyer noted that forty years had gone by without a legal
challenge to the display.258  Indeed, he found that silence
"determinative," 259 apparently believing that "[t]hose 40 years suggest
that the public visiting the capitol grounds has considered the religious
aspect of the tablets' message as part of what is a broader moral and
historical message reflective of a cultural heritage. 26 ° Yet, there might
be a variety of reasons that such a display would not be challenged.
As Justice Souter notes, "Suing a State over religion puts nothing in a
plaintiffs pocket and can take a great deal out, and even with volunteer
litigators to supply time and energy, the risk of social ostracism can be
powerfully deterrent." 26 Thus, it is hardly safe to infer that no one was
religiously offended by the Ten Commandments merely because no
one was willing to spend dollars, time, energy, and social standing to
challenge them in court.
Numerous concerns might have motivated Justice Breyer's
concurrence. For example, he noted that the Ten Commandments are
displayed in many of the Nation's courthouses, including the United
States Supreme Court,262 and perhaps feared that any other decision
would result in challenges to those displays as well as to a number of
displays in other public buildings,26 thereby creating the kind of
divisiveness based on religion that the Establishment Clause is
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring).
261. Id. at 747 (Souter, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring).
263. Id. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Such a holding might well encourage disputes
concerning the removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments from public
buildings across the Nation").
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264designed to prevent. Yet, it may well be that Justice Breyer's
concurrence in the judgment will not reduce the amount of litigation
and divisiveness but will simply result in a modification of the kinds of
cases that will come before the courts. There are a great many factors
to be taken into account when one exercises "legal judgment," and a
difference in any one of them might be reason to bring a challenge to a
particular display. Suppose, for example, that a display of the Ten
Commandments was not surrounded by other secular displays. Would
that be enough to make it unconstitutional? 265 Suppose that we are not
discussing a longstanding display but a new one, although this time the
display will not be the Ten Commandments but instead a motto like
"With God All Things Are Possible." Would that pass constitutional
muster?2
66
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the "sole function of
the monument on the grounds of Texas' State Capitol is to display the
full text of one version of the Ten Commandments.' 267 Noting that the
monument, "does not refer to any event in the history of the State,"268
he explained,
264. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). See also William Van Alstyne, Ten Commandments,
Nine Judges, and Five Versions of One Amendment - The First. ("Now What?'), 14 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 17, 24 (2005).
What followed, for Justice Breyer, was for him to find a way to split
the difference, so to speak. In his view, as he had just spoken to it, the
proliferation of other "divisive" lawsuits such as this could best be
discouraged simply by finding no conflict (or at least no sufficient
conflict) with the Establishment Clause. Thus, by finding no sufficient
conflict in this case (and in his view possibly not otherwise), the Court
might suitably signal to others that it would be pointless for any of them to
bring other such "divisive" suits of a similar sort, and so spare the Court
itself, as well as the greater polity, more acrimony and grief.
Id.
265. See ACLU v. Plattsmouth, Neb., 358 F.3d 1020, 1039 (8th Cir. 2004) (reh'g granted
and vacated Apr. 6, 2004) ("Nor is this monument affixed to a historical building; rather, it sits
alone in a park without a secularizing context."). This display of the Ten Commandments was
ultimately upheld. See ACLU Neb. Found. v. Plattsmouth, Neb., 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir.
2005), an opinion based on Van Orden, see id. at 776-78, notwithstanding some of the key
differences between the cases. See id. at 780-81 (Bye, J., dissenting).
266. Associated Press, Governor signs mandate to display donated mottoes in schools,
AP ALERT-OH, July 11, 2006 available at WL 7/11/06 APALERTOH 22:47:10.
Governor Taft signed a bill today requiring all public and community
schools to display any donated copies of the national and state mottoes,
despite constitutional concerns. The mottoes 'In God We Trust' and 'With
God, All Things Are Possible' have withstood court challenges suggesting
they violate the separation of church and state.
Id.
267. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 707 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
268. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Viewed on its face, Texas' display has no
purported connection to God's role in the formation of
Texas or the founding of our Nation; nor does it provide
the reasonable observer with any basis to guess that it
was erected to honor any individual or organization.
The message transmitted by Texas' chosen display is
quite plain: This State endorses the divine code of the
"Judeo-Christian" God.269
One of the factors which divides the Court is how to explain
the "religious neutrality" demanded by the First Amendment. 270 Under
one understanding of the view that "government may not exercise a
preference for one religious faith over another,"271 First Amendment
guarantees are not violated as long as no particular religion is
privileged. When the Fraternal Order of Eagles consulted with a
committee composed of individuals of different religions to come up
with a nonsectarian version of the Ten Commandments, they were
seeking not to privilege one religious view, although they would
nonetheless privilege some religious views over others.272 For
example, those religions which do not have a tenet that there is one
and only one God would seem to have their views undermined by the
Ten Commandments display.273
Consider the analysis offered by Justice Blackmun as to why
the government is precluded from favoring one religion. "When the
government puts its imprimatur on a particular religion, it conveys a
message of exclusion to all those who do not adhere to the favored
beliefs. A government cannot be premised on the belief that all persons
269. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 709 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("the Establishment Clause demands religious
neutrality-government may not exercise a preference for one religious faith over another").
271. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
272. But see County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 614-15 (1989).
The mere fact that Pittsburgh displays symbols of both Christmas and
Chanukah does not end the constitutional inquiry. If the city celebrates
both Christmas and Chanukah as religious holidays, then it violates the
Establishment Clause. The simultaneous endorsement of Judaism and
Christianity is no less constitutionally infirm than the endorsement of
Christianity alone.
Id.
273. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 712 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("This Nation's resolute
commitment to neutrality with respect to religion is flatly inconsistent with the plurality's
wholehearted validation of an official state endorsement of the message that there is one, and
only one, God.").
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are created equal when it asserts that God prefers some.,'27 4 Yet, by the
same token, if the government were to favor two or three religions, the
same difficulty arises, namely that the government cannot be premised
on the belief that all are equal when it asserts that God favors the
views of some religions over others.
Like the majority, Justice Stevens argued that the "wall that
separates the church from the State does not prohibit the government
from acknowledging the religious beliefs and practices of the
American people, nor does it require governments to hide works of art
or historic memorabilia from public view just because they also have
religious significance. '" 275 Yet, the question at hand is what must be
done to make sure that a paradigmatically religious display such as the
Ten Commandments does not offend constitutional guarantees.
Part of the analysis involves whether the Ten Commandments
are being displayed for a secular purpose. In Van Orden, the donors
were motivated by a desire to inspire youth and curb juvenile
27627delinquency, goals which are certainly secular in nature.277
However, having secular goals does not somehow immunize the
method by which one seeks to achieve those goals. As Justice Stevens
suggests, "But achieving that goal through biblical teachings injects a
,,278religious purpose into an otherwise secular endeavor. Otherwise,
missionary work would seem immune from constitutional challenge,
since "missionaries expect to enlighten their converts, enhance their
satisfaction with life, and improve their behavior., 27
9
In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,28 ° Justice
Brennan wrote, "What the Framers meant to foreclose, and what our
decisions under the Establishment Clause have forbidden, are those
involvements of religious with secular institutions which . . . use
essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular
means would suffice. 28 1 Justice Stevens is making a similar
suggestion in Van Orden when writing, "Though the State of Texas
may genuinely wish to combat juvenile delinquency, and may rightly
274. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 606-07 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
275. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 711 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 714 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
281. Id. at 294-95 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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want to honor the Eagles for their efforts, it cannot effectuate these
admirable purposes through an explicitly religious medium."
282
The dissenting Justices in Van Orden were not arguing that the
Ten Commandments can never be displayed by the State; instead, they
wanted the state to take steps so that it would not be viewed as sending
a religious message. Thus, Justice Souter suggests that a
"governmental display of an obviously religious text cannot be
squared with neutrality, except in a setting that plausibly indicates that
the statement is not placed in view with a predominant purpose on the
part of government either to adopt the religious message or to urge its
acceptance by others." 283 For example, suppose that a state wants to
call attention to the influence of the Ten Commandments on current
secular law. Justice Souter writes,
Government may, of course, constitutionally call
attention to this influence, and may post displays or
erect monuments recounting this aspect of our history
no less than any other, so long as there is a context and
that context is historical. Hence, a display of the
Commandments accompanied by an exposition of how
they have influenced modem law would most likely be
constitutionally unobjectionable.284
One issue that divides courts is what steps must be taken to
make a religious display such as the Ten Commandments less
religious.285 Given that a state's purpose in displaying the Ten
Commandments might have been secular rather than religious, a
separate question is whether in a given instance the state's purpose
was in fact to promote religion. 286 It is not at all clear that merely
282. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 715 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 737 (Souter, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 740-41 (Souter, J., dissenting). See also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
593-94 (1987) ("the Court acknowledged in Stone that its decision forbidding the posting of
the Ten Commandments did not mean that no use could ever be made of the Ten
Commandments, or that the Ten Commandments played an exclusively religious role in the
history of Western Civilization.").
285. Cf Books v. Elkhart, Ind., 235 F.3d 292, 303 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Here, the record
discloses no significant attempt by the City of Elkhart to present the text of the Ten
Commandments in a way that might diminish its religious character.").
286. See ACLU v. Plattsmouth, Neb., 358 F.3d 1020, 1039 (8th Cir. 2004) (reh'g granted
and vacated Apr. 6, 2004) ("Just because there are permissible secular purposes for displaying
the Ten Commandments, however, does not mean there is always a secular purpose for such a
display.").
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including different types of displays 287 would make clear that the
purpose behind their being displayed was secular without some kind of
writing which explains how the displays are related.288
One example of such a writing would be the explanation
described by Justice Souter, although the Court should not require
particular "talismanic' 289  language to "secularize" religious
displays, 29 both because such wording might be included to mask a
secret purpose to promote religion and because other wording might
nonetheless provide the requisite secularizing context. Nonetheless,
the Van Orden plurality could have been helpful in at least pointing to
examples of how to secularize rather than in simply implying that
because it is possible to include religious display for non-religious
purposes the state should therefore be assumed to have included the
religious display for non-religious purposes.
29 1
287. See Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2001)
("We start by saying that the display of secular texts along with the Ten Commandments does
not automatically lead to a finding that the purpose in erecting the monument is primarily
secular.").
288. See, e.g., State v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 898 P.2d 1013, 1032 (Colo.
1995) (Lohr, J., dissenting).
While the other monuments commemorate actual historical events in
American history, the Ten Commandments monument does not ...
Likewise, the state has not accompanied the Ten Commandments
monument display with a statement of purpose explaining the intended
message of the monument as it relates to the other monuments within
Lincoln Park. Because the other monuments neither relate to nor
secularize the meaning of the Ten Commandments monument, a
reasonable observer would not understand the undeniably religious
message of the Ten Commandments monument to be neutralized by the
monument's setting.
Id.
289. Cf NLRB v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 473 U.S. 61, 81 (1985) ("The various
linguistic formulae and evidentiary mechanisms we have employed.., are not talismanic nor
can they substitute for analysis.").
290. Actually, it is not making the object itself secular, see Books, 235 F.3d at 302 ("As a
starting point, we do not think it can be said that the Ten Commandments, standing by
themselves, can be stripped of their religious, indeed sacred, significance and characterized as
a moral or ethical document."), but making clear that the purpose for its display is secular. See
id.
The display of a religious symbol still may . . . have a secular
purpose. The text of the Ten Commandments no doubt has played a role in
the secular development of our society and can no doubt be presented by the
government as playing such a role in our civic order.
Id.
291. The district court found that the State had not had the appropriate secular purpose.
See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 712 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Though this Court has subscribed to the view that the Ten
Commandments influenced the development of Western legal thought, it
has not officially endorsed the far more specific claim that the Ten
2006] THOU SHALT NOT?
A separate issue is which version of the Ten Commandments to
include. One cannot create a neutral version of the Ten
Commandments in the sense that it would accord with the beliefs of all
those for whom the Commandments play an important religious
role,292 although that difficulty might be skirted by refraining from
using particular text and instead using symbols to stand for the
differing amendments.293 Of course, that modification might detract
from a display if, for example, the point was to include a copy of the
Ten Commandments which were thought to influence particular
Framers. In any event, even a display of a nonspecific version of the
Ten Commandments would disfavor those religions not having an
analog within their belief system 294 unless the secular purpose for
including that version was made very clear.
IV. CONCLUSION
Some commentators suggest that the Ten Commandments have
not played a role in the development of our law295 and should not be
Commandments played a significant role in the development of our
Nation's foundational documents (and the subsidiary implication that it has
special relevance to Texas) .... Whatever the historical accuracy of the
proposition, the District Court categorically rejected respondent's
suggestion that the State's actual purpose in displaying the Decalogue was
to signify its influence on secular law and Texas institutions.
Id.
292. See Finkelman, supra note 180, at 1492 ("it is quite impossible to have a
theologically neutral version of the Ten Commandments"). Cf Leslie C. Griffin, Their Own
Prepossessions: The Establishment Clause, 1999-2000, 33 Loy. U. CMi. L.J. 237, 265 (2001).
On public support, citizens should not be required to provide their tax
dollars for the benefit of religious practices, whether in public or private
institutions. Religious practices are particular. The ideal of a common
prayer or a common theology is illusory, and the government may not
establish a civil religion.
Id.
293. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text (discussing symbolic representation
of the amendments).
294. Cf. Finkelman, supra note 180, at 1481-82.
[S]uch a monument, even if neutral, would seem like an establishment of
religion to Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Taoists, followers of many Native
American faiths, and practitioners of other faiths that are not based on
Judaism or Christianity .... A Ten Commandments monument thus sends
a message to these Americans that they are not considered to be part of the
mainstream of society, but are "outsiders."
Id.
295. See Chemerinsky, supra note 136, at 6 ("Nor is there any indication that the Ten
Commandments were regarded as a source of secular law in the founding of this nation. They
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displayed for that reason. Yet such a claim would of course depend
upon the criteria used to determine which works have played a role in
the development of our law. For example, to argue that the Ten
Commandments have played no role because the Court has never cited
them as legal authority2 96 is to impose an unfair burden on those
wishing to establish that the Ten Commandments have played such a
role. As a general matter, when members of the Court mention or
discuss the Ten Commandments, they tend to downplay their role in
our law if only to avoid Establishment Clause difficulties.2 97 Thus,
Justices would be more likely to discuss the State's purposes as
coinciding or harmonizing with religious purposes as a way of
demonstrating that the Ten Commandments did not have undue
influence on the development of the law.298 Yet, their downplaying the
influence is more a testament to their believing that the
Commandments have had a great influence than that they have had no
influence.
It is a matter of some dispute among members of the Court as
to how foundational the Ten Commandments are,299 but it simply is
not credible to believe that the Establishment Clause would preclude
the exhibition of the Ten Commandments solely because of some
are not mentioned in the records of the Constitutional Convention nor in the history of state
legislatures drafting their initial statutes."); Finkelman, supra note 180, at 1514.
296. See Id. at 1514 ("The claim that the Ten Commandments is a foundational document
is not supported by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. The U.S. Supreme Court has only used
the term 'Ten Commandments' in twenty-two cases. In none of these cases does the Court use
the Ten Commandments as legal authority.").
297. See, e.g., McGowan, 366 U.S. 420, 462 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("Innumerable civil regulations enforce conduct which harmonizes with religious canons.
State prohibitions of murder, theft and adultery reinforce commands of the decalogue.").
298. See, e.g., id. at 442-43 ("However, it is equally true that the 'Establishment' Clause
does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to
coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions."); Hennington v. Ga., 163 U.S.
299, 307 (1896) ("That which is properly made a civil duty by statute is none the less so
because it is also a real or supposed religious obligation .. "); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S.
479, 529 n.2 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("To be sure, the injunction contained in the
Connecticut statute coincides with the doctrine of certain religious faiths. But if that were
enough to invalidate a law under the provisions of the First Amendment relating to religion,
then most criminal laws would be invalidated."). See, e.g., Exodus 20:2 (King James) (the Ten
Commandments).
299. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 712 n.9 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Though this Court has subscribed to the view that the Ten
Commandments influenced the development of Western legal thought, it
has not officially endorsed the far more specific claim that the Ten
Commandments played a significant role in the development of our
Nation's foundational documents (and the subsidiary implication that it has
special relevance to Texas).
THOU SHALT NOT?
implicit requirement regarding the degree to which they must be
foundational for them to be displayed publicly. Any plausible standard
would be extremely difficult to articulate and even more difficult to
justify in light of the relevant history, case law, or even good public
policy.
Suppose that one could get past the difficulties involved in
spelling out this foundationalism requirement. Further, suppose that
the Ten Commandments met the relevant test. Their being displayed
might nonetheless violate Establishment Clause guarantees, at least in
light of the Lemon Test, the Endorsement Test, or the Coercion Test.
Basically, the relevant question is not whether the Framers or others
were influenced by religious texts. Rather, the important questions
would involve what the State was trying to do and what effects the
state action would have.
The Court's recent Ten Commandments decisions are not
disappointing merely because they appear to have been a compromise
but because they made it so obvious that the current Establishment
Clause jurisprudence does no work,30 0 and because members of the
Court continue to engage in conclusory name-calling merely because
others disagree with them, instantiating the kind of religious discord
which the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid. Not only do Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia suggest that those disagreeing
with them are hostile to religion, 30 1 but even Justice Breyer suggests
that the dissenters in Van Orden interpret "the law to exhibit a hostility
toward religion that has no place in our Establishment Clause
,,302traditions. Yet, one would expect that in a "borderline" case
requiring "legal judgment," even reasonable Justices open to religion
might nonetheless disagree about the disposition of a close case.
Under the best of circumstances, it is very difficult to offer a
plausible interpretation of the Religion Clauses which gives due
300. See id. at 694-95 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he incoherence of the Court's
decisions in this area renders the Establishment Clause impenetrable and incapable of
consistent application.").
301. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 900 (2005).
As bad as the Lemon test is, it is worse for the fact that, since its
inception, its seemingly simple mandates have been manipulated to fit
whatever result the Court aimed to achieve. Today's opinion is no
difterent. in two respects it oudui-q L.ciJiuii tc iat.- up.
hostility to religion.
Id. See also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683-84 (suggesting that the Court must "neither abdicate
[its] responsibility to maintain a division between church and state nor evince a hostility to
religion by disabling the government from in some ways recognizing our religious heritage").
302. Id. at 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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respect to the Framers' intentions, our history, the developing case
law, and the widely differing faith traditions represented in this
country. But these are not the best of circumstances. When the Court
refuses to apply the tests it claims applicable or applies the applicable
tests in ways belied by its own jurisprudence, the Court, conscientious
belief, and society itself are all losers. We can only hope that the Court
in the not-too-distant future will seek to emulate the goals of the
Establishment Clause rather than the evils which that Clause was
designed to avoid.
